Sutta Nipāta 4-11: Kalahavivādasutta

1. ‘Whence (do spring up) contentions and disputes, lamentation and sorrow together with envy; and arrogance and conceit together with slander, whence do these spring up? pray, tell me this.’ (862)

2. ‘From dear (objects) spring up contentions and disputes, lamentation and sorrow together with envy; arrogance and conceit together with slander; contentions and disputes are joined with envy, and there is slander in the disputes arisen.’ (863)

3. ‘The dear (objects) in the world whence do they originate, and (whence) the covetousness that prevails in the world, and desire and fulfilment whence do they originate, which are (of consequence) for the future state of a man?’ (864)

4. ‘From wish originate the dear (objects) in the world, and the covetousness that prevails in the world, and desire and fulfilment originate from it, which are (of consequence) for the future state of a man.’ (865)

5. ‘From what has wish in the world its origin, and resolutions whence do they spring, anger and falsehood and doubt, and the Dhammas which are made known by the Samaṇa (Gotama)?’ (866)

6. ‘What they call pleasure and displeasure in the world, by that wish springs up; having seen decay and origin in (all) bodies, a person forms (his) resolutions in the world. (867)

7. ‘Anger and falsehood and doubt, these Dhammas are a couple; let the doubtful learn in the way of knowledge, knowingly the Dhammas have been proclaimed by the Samaṇa.’ (868)

8. ‘Pleasure and displeasure, whence have they their origin, for want of what do these not arise? This notion which (thou mentionest), viz. “decay and origin,” tell me from what does this arise.’ (869)

9. ‘Pleasure and displeasure have their origin from phassa (touch), when there is no touch they do not arise. This notion which (thou mentionest), viz. “decay and origin,” this I tell thee has its origin from this.’ (870)

10. ‘From what has phassa its origin in the world and from what does grasping spring up? For want of what is there no egotism, by the cessation of what do the touches not touch? ’ (871)

11. ‘On account of name and form the touches (exist), grasping has its origin in wish; by the cessation of wishes there is no egotism, by the cessation of form the touches do not touch.’ (872)

12. ‘How is one to be constituted that (his) form may cease to exist, and how do joy and pain cease to exist? Tell me this, how it ceases, that we should like to know, such was my mind?’ (873)

13. ‘Let one not be with a natural consciousness, nor with a mad consciousness, nor without consciousness, nor with (his) consciousness gone; for him who is thus constituted form ceases to exist, for what is called delusion has its origin in consciousness.’ (?) (874)

14. ‘What we have asked thee thou hast explained unto us; we will ask thee another question, answer us that: Do not some (who are considered) wise in this world tell us that the principal (thing) is the purification of the yakkha, or do they say something different from this?’ (875)

15. ‘Thus some (who are considered) wise in this world say that the principal (thing) is the purification of the yakkha; but some of them say samaya (annihilation), the expert say (that the highest purity lies) in anupādisesa (none of the five attributes remaining). (876)

16. ‘And having known these to be dependent, the investigating Muni, having known the things we depend upon, and after knowing them being liberated, does not enter into dispute, the wise (man) does not go to reiterated existence.’ (877)

Kalahavivādasutta is ended.